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The paper examines the conditions under which technological successions can occur in the presence of 
network externalities.  A multi-agent model is developed in which the product designs offered by firms 
co-evolve with consumer preferences.  Firms compete though product innovation.  The model 
incorporates a modified genetic algorithm (GA) in which imitation is conducted via a process of 
selective transfer (a one-way crossover) and internal R&D is conducted via selective mutation.   
Following an initial period in which old technology firms develop their designs and network 
externalities accrue, a technological shock occurs in which new technology-based firms enter the 
market.  The findings of the model indicate that a necessary condition for a technological succession 
are the existence of at least one consumer group that champions the new technology, developing new 
preferences for its characteristics.  Further, the introduction of novel characteristics are have a greater 
bearing on the probability of a succession than incremental gains in characteristics offered by the old 
technology.  Third, the analysis identifies an inverse relationship between time the probability of a 
technological succession.  
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Introduction: technological successions and network externalities 
 
 
Schumpeter laid stress on the importance of technological discontinuities in economic 
history.  In contrast to Marshall, who on the front page of his ‘Principles of 
Economics’ stated that Natura non facit saltum (Nature does not leap), Schumpeter 
argued that “evolution is lopsided, discontinuous, disharmonious by nature... studded 
with violent outbursts and catastrophes... more like a series of explosions than a 
gentle, though incessant, transformation” (Schumpeter, 1939, p. 102).  Schumpeter 
did not question the existence of long periods of gradual development marked by the 
incremental development of established technologies.  However, he stressed that such 
periods are punctuated by short bursts in which radically new technologies – such as 
the steam engine, the dynamo, the internal combustion engine and the integrated 
circuit - yield alternative products, processes and associated knowledges that displace 
existing technologies and lead to key structural changes in the economy as old 
industries are displaced by new industries, and old employment patterns replaced by 
new ones.  It is the appearance of these new major technological breakthroughs that 
drive the economic system in a new direction.  Such a shift “so displaces its 
equilibrium point that the new one cannot be reached from the old one by 
infinitesimal steps.  Add successively as many mail coaches as you please, you will 
never get a railway thereby”  (Schumpeter, 1939, p.37).  Hence, for Schumpeter, 
economic development occurs when an economy moves from one base technology to 
another.  New technologies are the fuel of economic growth and the source of welfare 
improvement over the long-run (Figure 1).   
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The Schumpeterian thesis of economic development has diffused widely since the late 
1970s.  Important impetus was provided by the work of Mensch (1979), Freeman, 
Clark and Soete (1982), and Kleinknecht (1990) on long-run economic cycles.   
Subsequently, important aspects of the Schumpeterian thesis have been adopted 
within mainstream neo-classical economics, e.g. in the literature on real business 
cycles (Nelson and Plosser, 1982; Kydland and Prescott, 1982) and in endogenous 
growth theory (Romer, 1994; Aghion and Howitt. 1992). 
 
 
The focus of this paper is the conditions under which a new technology can overcome 
the network externalities enjoyed by an established (old) technology.  In this respect, 
the paper draws together two areas of research that were, by and large, previously 
treated as separate: competition between sequential technologies and standards 
competitions.  Research on network externalities has tended to consider standards 
competitions that occur between rival versions of a new technology (e.g. Arthur, 
1989; Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Farrell and Saloner, 1985).  A notable exception is 
David’s empirical case study of the QWERTY keyboard (David, 1985).  The 
DVORAK keyboard, a later and more efficient typing layout, was unable to displace 




David’s analysis discusses the institutional and behavioural factors that can keep a 
population locked in to an established technology.  In this paper we wish to examine 
the set of factors that can enable externalities to be overcome.  Section 2 of the paper 
discusses three key factors.  The first concerns a differentiation of the characteristics 
offered by established and new technologies (Lancaster, 1971; Archibald and Eaton, 
1989).  It may not be sufficient for a new technology to simply offer a higher 
specification in a limited number of common characteristics (Hotelling, 1929).  The 
second factor is the existence of differential rates of cost reduction due to the scale 
economies associated with different technologies.  Differential falling unit costs of 
alternative technologies affect demand when these are transmitted to prices, altering the 
price-quality combinations offered by old and new technology products (Choi et al., 
1990).  The third factor considered is the role that is played by user groups that are 
willing to experiment with new technologies leading to the development of new 
preferences.  Herein lies an important distinction between technological successions and 
technological substitutions.  In the former, new preferences emerge through a process of 
experimentation with new technologies.  In the latter, a new technology better fulfils a 
given, unchanging set of user preferences.  The fourth factor considered is time.  The 
time with which new technology providers are able to exploit their superior 
applications may affect the probably of a technological succession occurring.   
 
 
Given the large number of parameters involved, and the desire to examine these in a 
meaningful manner, the paper employs simulation techniques in section 3 in order to 
develop a model of technological successions.  This is an agent-based model 
containing heterogeneous populations of adaptive users and providers that co-evolve 
over time.  Producers employ various adjustment rules to their production routines 
while simultaneously innovating through a combination of imitation and internal  4
R&D.  The model incorporates a modified genetic algorithm (GA) in which imitation 
is conducted via a process of selective transfer (a one-way crossover) and internal 
R&D is conducted via selective mutation.  Section 4 provides details of the 
implementation of the model, the properties of which are tested through the estimation 
of a set of statistical models whose explanatory capabilities are compared.  The results 




2.  Conditions for a technological succession 
 
 
An important starting point for the current paper is Shy’s (1996) discussion of consumer 
substitution between network externality and quality in sequential technology 
competitions.  In contrast to earlier papers by Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Katz and 
Shapiro (1986), the successive generations model developed by Shy focuses on repeated 
technology adoptions by different generations of adopters.  Shy’s model allows for 
different preferences between an ‘old’ consumer type and a ‘young’ consumer type 
(although preferences within each generation are assumed to be identical).  In so doing, 
the model introduces an important distinction between a technological succession and a 
technological substitution.  A technological substitution, such as the replacement of 
manual assembly processes by Taylorist (semi-)automated production processes, raised 
welfare by shifting the production possibility frontier for a given level of factor inputs.  
There is no change in consumer preferences.  By contrast, a technological succession 
involves the introduction of new artefacts that alter consumption opportunities for a 
particular level of output.  A succession is associated with change in both the dominant 
technological artefact produced by firms and the prevailing set of consumer preferences, 
as a new production-consumption nexus displaces an established production-
consumption nexus.   
 
 
Shy’s paper suggests that a technological succession can occur provided the young 
consumer type treats quality and network externalities as substitutes (the later technology 
is  de facto assumed to be of higher quality).  If, however, quality and network 
externalities are treated as complements, then the old technology will be selected.   
Unfortunately, a number of issues are ‘black boxed’ in the Shy model: issues that are 
likely to affect the probability of a succession occurring.  To begin with, three aspects of 
consumer demand need to be considered.  First, one must clearly establish the basis on 
which later rival, technologies can displace an old technology.  Second, one needs to 
carefully spell out the issue of ‘quality’.  The Shy model assumes that one technology is 
unambiguously superior to another.  This is unlikely to be the case in reality.  Indeed, 
historical studies of technological change indicate that later technologies tend to be better 
in some aspects of performance but weaker in others (Grübler, 1990).  Furthermore, the 
actual sets of attributes are likely to differ, i.e. some attributes associated with a new 
technology are not present in the old technology and vice versa.  Thus an important 
stylised fact of sequential technological competitions is differentiation across attributes 
as well as differences in the quality of shared attributes.  Third, the Shy model does not 
consider the implications of a heterogeneous consumer population.  Clearly, in the 
presence of product diversity, one needs to appreciate the way in which consumers – 
with heterogeneous preferences – compare rival technologies and make their  5
selections.  On the supply-side, two issues are unexplored by the Shy model.  First, the 
cost of producing these different attributes, or characteristics, will be reflected in the 
different prices of rival technology designs.  A trade-off between new and/or improved 
attributes and the cost of their production is likely to arise.  Second, the rate of falling 
unit costs due to static and dynamic economies of scale is likely to have important 




2.1 Functional  equivalence 
 
 
A technological succession involves the displacement of an established product or 
process by a new alternative that fulfils the same basic function.  Grübler, for 
example, has collected data that for primary energy sources and transport (Grübler et 
al., 1988; Grübler, 1990) that clearly show sequential technology successions, with 
changing relative market shares of successive technologies over time.  The horse was 
replaced by the train, which was in turn succeeded by buses and then cars as the 
dominant mode of land-based transport in the US and Western Europe.  Similarly, 
water was succeeded first by fuel wood, coal, and then oil as the primary energy 
source of the industrialised world.  These alternative and competing forms of energy 
and land-based transport can be clustered because they share common functions.  In 
the case of transport, the common function is to move humans and/or goods from one 
point to another, in the case of basic energy it is to provide heat and power.  In other 
words, there is a functional equivalence between the new technologies and the older 
technologies they displace.  Users consider the available alternatives and make 
choices based on some perceived difference between the relative fitness of purpose.  
Thus for a new technology to succeed an established technology, users must be 
persuaded that an alternative technology can in some sense better fulfil the product or 





2.2  Quality of alternative designs 
 
 
Conventional economics ties the relative fitness of competing products to welfare.  
The economic literature contains some important precedents for an analytical 
treatment of how consumers first compare, and then rank, substitutable goods.  In the 
past the analysis has tended to focus on one aspect of a good - its price - in order to 
explain the relative price elasticity of a commodity.  Here we are interested in the 
process by which consumers compare not just price but also the performance 
characteristics of rival technologies.  To this end a useful link can be made to the 
literature on consumer choice and product differentiation.  The characteristics (or 
address) approach to modelling product differentiation dates back to Hotelling (1929) 
and has been used in a number of empirical studies (e.g. Saviotti, 1988; Archibald and 
Eaton, 1989; Choi et al., 1990; Frenken et al., 1999).  Following Lancaster (1971), the 
Hotelling model can be adapted in order to describe a commodity in terms of the 
bundle of characteristics (or attributes) that it embodies.  The important insight of  6
Lancaster is that a commodity is not desired for itself but, rather, because it offers 
certain performance characteristics that, in combination, translate into functionalities 
that form the basis of selection according to consumers preferences.  For example, the 
basic function of a car is to transport people and goods from one place to another.  
Additionally, a car’s design may please the user aesthetically, distinguishing it from 
rival designs.   
 
 
A firm competes by offering a combination of characteristics that it believes will be 
more attractive to consumers than those offered by its rivals.  In this way a firm 
effectively offers consumers a distinct point within a multi-dimensional character 
space.  Product innovation is the means by which firms search this n-dimensional 
character space.  The ability to offer a set of new, previously unavailable 
characteristics that are in some sense attractive to consumers is likely to be an 




2.3  Trade-off between quality and price 
 
 
A trade-off is likely to exist between the quality of the rival technologies and their 
price, tied to costs of producing these alternative bundles of characteristics.  Given 
that consumer welfare depends on both the relative performance of each technology 
and their price, this will affect demand and hence the outcome of a technological 
competition.  Indeed, Arthur (1989) has highlighted the importance of scale 
economies in production as one of the key factors likely to determine the outcome of 
technological competitions (also see Rosenberg, 1982).  While a new technology 
design may provide previously unavailable characteristics, this is likely to be at an 
initially higher price.  An established technology may enjoy static (level of 
production) scale economies and/or dynamic economies of scale (due to learning by 
doing) garnered over time.  Both, of course, are initially unavailable to a new 
technology entrant.  Having said this, the initial disadvantages of the new entrant may 
be overcome if unit costs of the new technology fall at a faster rate than those of the 
old technology.   If firms are differentiated by both design quality and unit cost of 
production, then ceteris paribus market selection of the new and old technologies will 




2.4  New consumer preferences 
 
 
As noted previously, a technological succession is associated with the development of 
new consumer preferences.  By and large, the issue of changing preferences has been 
avoided by economists.  In models of technological diffusion and in traditional 
consumer theory, for example, user preferences are assumed to be exogenously given 
and unchanging.   In each case, this is a simplifying assumption which facilitates the 
development of models capable of producing analytically tractable results.  In the  7




It is interesting to contrast the situation in economics with that in psychology, 
sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, and marketing, where discussions of 
changing consumer preferences are well established.  There changes in individual 
tastes have been linked to a range of social, economic and cultural factors.  Notable 
influences include the individual’s ‘lifestyle’ (Giddens, 1991), social class (Bourdieu, 
1984), and the influence of prominent figures within cultural/social networks (Becker, 
1984).  Fashions, for example, are commonly driven by social influences (Simmel, 
1957).  Individuals belonging to a particular group may seek to establish a collective 
identity, and simultaneously distinguish themselves from other social groups, via their 
improvisation with novel technologies.  However these consumption patterns may 
loose their attraction for these ‘pioneers’ if other groups start to consume these 
services.   Over time then, the values attached to the characteristics offered by a 
particular product can change (increase or decrease) over time.  The marketing 
activities of companies may also influence individual preferences.  In the case of 
fashion, companies’ marketing activities are clearly aimed at influencing users’ 
desires for the characteristics provided by their products.  Indeed, the last twenty years 
has seen the development by firms of innovative front-office tools such as branding, 
direct mail, loyalty schemes, and relationship marketing through internet-based ICTs, 
all aiming to cultivate demand for their products. 
 
 
In order for a novel technology to first take hold, it needs to be supported by at least 
one group of consumers that is willing, and capable, of experimenting with its novelty 
(Rosenberg, 1982; Rogers, 1983).  A necessary condition for technological succession 
is thus the appearance of a new ‘type’ of consumer preference; one that gives weight 
to the particular characteristics of the new technology.  Take, for example, the recent 
diffusion of the internet.  Cultural and social theorists have drawn attention to the 
innovative role played by distinct forms of youth culture that developed in the early 
1980s.  The internet facilitates the (virtual) interaction of readers and writers in ways 
that are very difficult to achieve in print – especially for young people.  Publishing on 
the web by young people aged 13 to 18 is motivated by the desire to participate in, or 
create, a distinct community (Abbott, 1998).  An important strategy for acquiring 
membership and defining oneself as part of the community, is the ability to sustain 
contemporary knowledge of the appropriate words, spelling of words, contractions 
acronyms, emoticons and appropriate and inappropriate terms which change from 
week to week.   
 
 
Experimentation with non-standard English is directly related to the supplanting of the 
print era.  “Supposedly proper grammar, dictionary definitions and correct spellings 
have all been the result of printing press uniformity.  The standardised forms did not 
exist before the advent of the printing press, and they probably won’t exert the same 
hold over our minds as the influence of the printing press declines” (Spender, 1995, 
p.xx).  Computer-culture theorists such as Turkle (1995) go further, seeing in the new 
uses of computers “fundamental shifts in the way we create and experience human 
identity” (1995, p.10).  Cyberculture on the internet, she argues, was distinct to other  8
forms of culture and was populated with distinctive species of human beings - 
hackers, MUDers and cyberpunks.  This phenomenon, and the trope of 
newness/danger, was not unique to the USA or Europe.  In Japan there is the 
phenomenon of the Otaku-Zokui: the ‘at home tribe’.  Otaku are (typically) young 
men who spend most of their time at home at their computers, assessing, processing 
and distributing information about a very specific aspect of the world of television, 
music, movies or comic books (Grassmuck, 1990; Greenfield, 1993).  Tobin observes 
that “cyberculture is a dyadic relationship between young people with computers and 
older people reacting to them, trying to control them, and worrying about them” 
(Tobin, 1998, p.111). 
 
 
Championing of a technology by at least one group of users provides the resources 
necessary for firms to engage in R&D, further developing the attributes that are 
distinct to the technology.  Subsequently, other groups of users become aware of these 
distinct attributes and also begin to adopt the technology, leading to a change in their 
preference sets.  These later adopters may be more conservative and less technically 
competent.  As a consequence, technological designs need to become more reliable 
and more robust.  For example, a variety of software packages now exist that enable 
users to develop web pages and organise websites without the need to write XML 
script or learn a computer language.  Still, while some of the more radical social and 
political aspirations of its early adopters may become diluted, distinctive aspects of 
will remain intact as it diffuses amongst other user groups (Pinch and Bijker, 1984).  
In the case of the internet, for example, it has no central structure or organisation, is 
hardware and software independent, and is an inherently two-way medium that 
requires adopters to develop new styles of communication.  Indeed, its ubiquitous 







Austrian economists have long emphasised the importance of time as an important 
variable in economics.  On the demand side, the network externality associated with 
an established technology will continue to increase incrementally over time.  On the 
supply side, the longer old technology firms have to learn about the preferences of 
preferences of their existing users, and the longer they have to perform R&D in order 
to optimise the performance of their designs, the greater the probability of their 
identifying designs that maximise the utility of their customers.  Independently, each 
factor could effectively lock-out a new technology.  Together, they represent a 
significant barrier that increases with time.  Ex ante one would expect the probability 
of a technological succession occurring to be inversely related to the length of time 




2.6  The adopter’s choice problem 
 
 
From the proceeding discussion we see that there is likely to be a number of factors 
influencing consumer preferences, and that these interact in a complex manner.  Three 
factors in particular have been highlighted above: production costs, price and 
performance quality.  Formalising this, the probability of adopting the new technology 
B rather than the established technology A at time t is  
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where  x is the characteristic vector of a technology design  
e is the network externality  
 p is the price of that design 
V is the indirect utility of money that can be obtained in other markets 
 
 
Here we assume that all other markets are fixed and that this function has a constant 
form.  U(x) is the direct utility of consuming the good with characteristic vector x.  
Note that the utility of not buying a good is V(m) and so a consumer will only accept 
offer (x, p) if  ui(x) > Vi(m) - Vi(m-pi).  That is to say, an adopter only makes a 
purchase when direct utility outweighs the lost in indirect utility, or opportunity cost, 
of the purchase.  
 
 
In the presence of heterogeneous preferences, an analytically tractable solution for 
equation 1 is unlikely to exist in all but the simplest of circumstances.  Multiple 
equilibria solutions can exist in which it is impossible to predict ex ante whether there 
will be a technological succession, a technological substitution, a mixed solution in 
which both old and new technologies coexist, or even a technological lock-out.  First, 
multiple equilibria solutions will exist, even when the performance characteristics of 
one technology are absolutely superior to those of another, if there is a high frequency 
of intermediate valuations within the consumer population.  Second, rival 
technologies typically offer different relative strengths across a set of performance 
characteristics.  Again, given heterogeneous preferences, it is impossible to predict ex 
ante whether a technological succession will occur.  One way of tackling the problem 
is to construct a simulation model with which one can analyse the consequences of 
heterogeneous consumer preferences, and the co-evolutionary dynamics of changing 




3.  A model of technological succession 
 
 
3.1 The  Market 
 
 
After initialisation, overall control of the model passes to a market object that runs the 
model for the number of time periods specified in the model configuration.  In each 
period this market object proceeds as follows, 
 
1.  It brings the consumer groups to market in a random order and gets the groups 
to determine their demands and purchases. 
 
2.  It initiates the replicator dynamic for that period to redistribute the consumer 
population across the groups. 
 





3.2 Consumers  dynamics 
 
 
There are M consumer groups.  Associated with group i = 1,...,M is a utility function 
ui is defined over the offer space, namely the Cartesian product X× P of design space X 
and the price space P (positive real numbers) of the form 
 
Ui(x,p) = ∑k α ikvk(xk) + β iw(m− p) = α i⋅ v(x) + β iw(m− p) (2) 
 
 
Here  m is the budget of the consumer and is assumed to be the same for all 
consumers.  The term β iw(m− p) is the indirect utility obtained by spending the 
residual budget in other markets.  All consumers in the same group are assumed to 
adopt the same utility function.  Each firm offers to sell a good with some design x at 
some price p.  Consumers use these utility functions to rank alternative offers and as a 
measure of well-being.  Note that consumers always have the option of not accepting 
any of the offers and may keep all of their budget for use elsewhere.  The utility of  
this option is β iw(m) and will be called the null utility.  It can be seen that the utility 
functions differ across groups only in having different values for the coefficients α i 
and β i.  Currently we use a simple square root function for the component functions, 
i.e.  
vk(xk) = √ xk   and    w(m− p) = √ (m− p) (3) 
 
The population of consumers in each period is G and a form of the replicator 
dynamics described below governs the distribution across the M groups.  Let Git be 
the number of consumers of type i at time t.  We use the subscript t only when  11
necessary to distinguish between periods.  In each period firm j offers a quantity Qj of 
a particular design-price combination (xj,pj).  After firms have ‘posted’ these offers, 
consumer groups appear in the market in a random order.  Let I(i), with i = 1,...,M, be 
a permutation of the indices {1,…,M} so that I(1) is the first group to come to market.  
Note that this permutation will differ from period to period.  Given the utility function 
UI(1) associated with this group, the consumers rank the offers (xj,pj) in descending 
order of preference.  
 
Let  J(j) with j = 0,1,…,M represent this ranking, so that J(j) is a permutation of 
{0,1,…,M}, where 0 represents the ‘null offer’, i.e. buy none of the goods.  If the null 
offer is best (i.e. J(0)=0) the consumers in that group exit the market without buying 
anything.  If the firm ranked highest by the consumers has an offer which dominates 
the null offer (i.e. J(0)>0) then all consumers in that group will ‘post’ a demand for 
one unit of that offer.  If firm J(0) has produced a sufficient quantity of the good (i.e. 
QJ(0) ≥  GI(1)) then all these demands will be converted into sales, all consumers in the 
group exit the market and the available quantity of the good is reduced by the volume 
of sales, i.e. QJ(0) ⇐  QJ(0) −  GI(1).  
 
If demand exceeds supply (i.e. QJ(0) < GI(1)) then QJ(0) demands are converted into 
sales, QJ(0) of the consumer leave the market and the available quantity of the good 
becomes zero and the remaining consumers G1 −  QJ(0) consider their next best option 
J(1).  The interaction of these remaining consumers with this offer is identical to 
interaction with J(0). If J(1) = 0 they leave the market, otherwise they post demands 
for the goods and these are met fully or partly depending on the quantity QJ(1) on 
offer.  This process for group I(1) continues until all consumers in the group have left 
the market.  Group I(2) enters the market and interacts with firms in the same way 
apart from the fact that the quantities available to this group will be reduced by any 
sales made to group I(1) consumers.  This continues until all groups have entered and 
left the market.  When group I(i), i > 1, enters the market the quantities available will 
be the Qj’s minus any sales made to consumer groups I(k) for k = 1,...,i-1. 
 
After this process in period t each consumer group will have attained an average level 
of utility Wit.  This is the average utility of the consumers in the group after they have 
consumed any good bought in this market.  Note that all consumers will attain a utility 
no less than the null utility and thus Wit will be no less than the null utility.  
 
Let ρ it = Git ÷  G, where G is the total population, be the proportion of the consumer 
population in the ith group.  Given these utilities the new distribution ρ it+1 is 
calculated as 
ρ it+1 = ρ it ×   rWit ÷  Σ k (ρ kt ×   rWkt) (3)  12
where r is factor determining the strength of the replicator effect of the differing 
utilities.  Groups with above-average utilities grow larger and groups with below-




3.3  Firms: prices, profits, wealth, production and capacity  
 
 
Firms adjust to excess demand by altering output and production capacity.  In the 
beginning of period t, firm j has monetary wealth or cash Mjt, capacity or capital Kjt, 
design xjt, a level of production yit and an inventory of unsold goods qjt.  The unit 
variable cost of production is given by the cost function 
 
C(x) = Σ k γ k ck(xk)   (4) 
 
 
Note that the cost function is common to all firms and is seen to represent the 
available technology available to all firms.  Note also that this cost is independent of 
the level of production.  The cost function is available to firms in the sense that they 




2   (5) 
 
 
It is assumed firms face a fixed cost Φ  so that the average total cost of producing 
output y of design x is C(x) + Φ /y.  Hence with Φ  > 0 there are increasing returns to 
scale in the sense that these average total costs are falling. 
 
 
Firms set prices according to a simple mark up rule, namely  
 
pjt = (1+η jt) ×  (C(xjt) + Φ  ÷  yjt)   (6) 
 
 
In current simulations there is a common and constant mark up so that η it = η , but the 
model allows the mark up to adjust to excess demands and supplies.  
 
 
At the start of the model, firms start with the same capacity and wealth but have their 
designs are randomly and independently generated. The variety between firms is 
initially in their designs and in their target consumer group; see the discussion of 
innovation below.  
 
 
Given the design and level of production the firm offers a quantity yjt + qjt of the 
design xjt at a price pjt.  After consumers have made their choices, signalled their 
demands and made their purchases, firms adjust their capacities, their levels of 
production and consider modifications to their designs.  Given its sales sjt and level of  13
production, each firm calculates its net revenue or current account profit for the 
period, namely Π jt = pjtsjt −  yjt C(xjt) −  Φ .  This profit is added to its monetary wealth: 
Mjt+1 = Mjt + Π jt.  If profit is negative and this monetary wealth becomes negative, 
then the firm has to sell capital sufficient stock to return monetary wealth to zero.  If 
the firm has insufficient capital stock to restore zero monetary wealth then it becomes 




A the firm calculates a new target level of production y*jt+1 as follows: 
 
y*jt+1 = χ djt + (1 −  χ ) sjt   (7) 
 
where χ  ∈  [0,1] is partial adjustment term and djt is the level of demand for the jth 
firm’s design in period t.  The firm adjusts its capacity given this target level of 
output.  Essentially, the firm aims to make capacity match this target level of output 
subject to the constraints that any increase in capacity cannot exceed its monetary 
wealth and that capacity cannot be negative.  Given this target capacity, the firm 
partially adjusts its capacity toward this target, 
 
Kjt+1 = Kjt + δ (K*jt+1 −  Kjt) (8) 
 
where δ  is a partial adjustment term and K*jt+1 is the target level of capacity.  K*jt+1 = 
y*jt+1 if (y*jt+1 −  Kjt) ≤  Mjt+1 otherwise K*jt+1 = Kjt + Mjt+1.  
 
 
Note that, after adjusting capacity, monetary wealth is adjusted as follows: 
 




3.4  Design innovation by firms 
 
 
Firms modify their designs in two stages.  In the first stage all firms consider 
mutations, while in the second stage all firms consider one-way transfers.  Both are 
subject to filtering by firms’ mental models.  Each firm targets one of the consumer 
types.  In this version of the model we simply by assuming the firm knows the utility 
function of that consumer type.  An innovation, mutation or transfer, is implemented 
only if it increases the utility of the target consumer type.  
 
 
Mutations are carried out in isolation of other firms.  Given design x for the jth firm at 
period t, the firm considers a mutated design x*.  Each component x*i mutates with 
probability µ  and if it does mutate it has the value xi + κε , where κ  is a mutation factor 
and ε  is a random number drawn from a standard normal distribution.  The mutated 
design replaces the current design only if it increases the utility of the firm’s target 
consumer type.   14
 
 
After mutation, firms consider further innovation based on imitation of rival firms.  
Each firm picks another firm in a biased random draw from the existing set of firms.  
Selection is biased toward to the more profitable firms, and is based on Goldberg’s 
‘roulette wheel’.  Here the probability of firm j being selected is proportional to the 
profit made by the firm j in the current period.  Having selected a rival, the firm 
creates a new candidate design x* by transferring part of the rival's design x
r to 
replace the matching elements of its current design.  A random set H of characteristics 
is selected and x*h = x
r
h for h ∈  H and x*h = xh for h ∉ H. 
 
 
This selective transfer operator is different to crossover in genetic algorithms.  Here 
there is no mutual exchange of elements, selective transfer is a one-way emulation
1.  
Hence the firm that is being emulated does not have to adjust its design as a 
consequence of this operator.  The new design x* replaces the current design x only if 




3.5 Technological  Shock 
 
 
Central to the Schumpeterian thesis is the periodic occurrence of major technological 
shocks that drive economic growth.  Innovative entrepreneurs seek to enter existing 
market niches through the introduction of alternative products based on radical 
technological breakthroughs and/or new scientific discoveries.  In this way, a new 
wave of innovative entrepreneurs simultaneously challenge the existing leading-edge 
of technology and the dominant market players that produce the established 
technology.   
 
 
New market entrants provide a second major source of new variety in the model.  As 
previously discussed, Schumpeter highlighted the role played by new entrants who 
seek to enter existing market niches through the introduction of alternative products.  
When successful, these lead to changing market shares and the demise of old 
technology firms.  Following Schumpeter (1912), we assume that barriers to entry for 
new start-up companies are low, new firms being able to freely access the existing, 
common knowledge domain.  In turn, the new knowledge generated by their innovate 
behaviour spills over into this common knowledge pool and so can be built upon by 
subsequent innovators.  
 
 
In the current model there is a technological shock at some period T1.  This shock has 
three features.  First, the design space qualitatively changes, i.e. the set of 
characteristics associated with the new technology differs to that of the old 
technology.  More specifically, up to time T1 the design space involves characteristics 
or dimensions 1 to h1 while after T1 the design space involves characteristics or 
                                                           
1 See Windrum and Birchenhall (1998) for a detailed discussion of the one-way selective transfer 
operator.  15
dimensions h2 to h, where 1 ≤  h2 ≤  h1 < h.  Furthermore, before T1 there is a limit xmax 
on characteristic values.  We use D1 and D2 to represent the design spaces before and 
after T1 respectively.  Before T1 all designs must belong to D1 and consumers place 
positive weight on characteristics 1 to h1 and zero weight on characteristics h1+1 to h. 
 
 
Second, whereas firms prior to T1 are producers of the old technology, after T1 there is 
a set of new entrants and these new entrants use the ‘new’ technology producers.  At 
the same time all new consumer groups born after T1 are ‘new’ technology 
consumers.  This is done in the following way: at T1 ‘dead’ firms and ‘dead’ 
consumer types are replaced by new generations of firms and consumer types.  A firm 
is treated as ‘dead’ if its market share has fallen below a cut-off value and a consumer 
type is ‘dead’ if its share of the consumer population has fallen below a cut-off value.  
The new firms created at time T1 must provide designs in D2.  New consumer types 
place positive weight on characteristics h2 to h and zero weight on characteristics 1 to 
h1-1.  Third, picking up on the earlier discussion of the possible importance of the 
relative rate of falling unit costs due to static and dynamic economies of scale, the cost 
of production for new technologies is reduced by a factor θ , i.e. after T1 all γ k are 




4. Implementation  details 
 
 
The current model uses three independent random number generators, RC, RF and 
RM, which are used to initialise and modify the consumers, firms and the market 
respectively.  These are independent in the sense that each has its own set of seeds.  In 
a run of the model these generators are used as follows, 
  
•  RC is used to assign values for parameters α , β  in the utility functions both at 
the start of the model and for new consumer groups at T1.  All values lie 
between 0.0 and 1.0.  
 
•  RF is used to assign initial designs and cost parameters γ k as well as control 
the mutations and transfers.  Apart from initial designs before T1 all values lie 
between 0.0 and 1.0. Initial designs before T1 are truncated at xmax. 
 
•  RM is used to randomly shuffle the order in which consumer groups arrive at 
the market.  
 
 
A batch job is used to control multiple runs of the model.  This batch job has its own 
random number generator RB.  The role of RB is outlined below. 
 
 
To study the properties of the above model, a batch job was used to run 400 versions 
of the model.  Here we describe this batch job and in the next section we present a 
statistical analysis of the model.  Before running the batch job a configuration file was 
used to set default values for the various parameters of the model (see Table 1 in  16
Appendix for key default values).  During the batch job, the following parameters 
were set randomly as follows. 
 
 
Symbol Description  Random  Range 
xmax  Maximum value of xi before T1  [0.3, 1.0] 
T1  Time of technological shock  [100, 200] 
h1  x∈  D1 has xi = 0 for i > h1 and β i = 0 for i > h1 [5, 8] 
θ   Cost reduction factor  [0.0, 0.3] 
CS1  First seed for RC [1,  10000] 
T2  Number of periods after T1  2 ×  T1 
T  Total Number of periods T1 + T2  3 ×  T1 
 







First, we report that the model is capable of producing technological successions.  
When these occur, changes in the aggregate level of consumer welfare conform to the 
pattern illustrated in Figure 2.  The envelope of aggregate utility is raised as the new 
technology displaces the previous incumbent within a particular market niche.  Hence, 
the model is capable of generating observed patterns of improvement illustrated in 
Figure 1 above.  The model therefore conforms to an important stylistic fact of long-
run economic development: the displacement of old technologies by new, more 
efficient technologies, raises consumer welfare over time.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Succession by a new technology providing higher welfare 
 
 
The ability of the model to produce results that accord to important stylised facts 
increases ones confidence in the model.  Of course, we are not simply concerned with 
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which technological successions are likely to occur.  As the model is rich in its 
parameters, we report a series of experiments that explore the dimensions of design 
characteristics h1, the upper bound on the values of characteristics offered by the old 
technology  xmax, time T1, and the cost reduction factor θ  as potential explanatory 
variables for a technological succession occurring. To this end, we constructed a logit 
model of the probability of succession P.  To estimate the models we take the 400 
simulations as observations on the model.   
 
 
As discussed in sections 1, 2 and 3, an important distinction needs to be made 
between technological ‘succession’ and a ‘substitution’.  A ‘succession’ occurs when, 
at the end of a simulation run, a new, ‘type two’ firm-consumer coupling has 
displaced an established, ‘type one’ firm-consumer coupling, i.e. only new technology 
firms remain and these sell all their output to new consumer types.  By contrast, a 
‘substitution’ occurs when type two firms displace type one firms but there is no 
change in consumer preferences, i.e. type two firms sell their output to type one 
consumers.   A third possibility is a mixed solution where type two firms displace 
type one firms and sell to a combination of both type one and type two consumers.   
 
 
Here we are here interested in separating out technological successions from all other 
cases.  Hence, we shall henceforth refer to the case of successions as ‘Successions’ 
and cluster both substitutions and mixed solutions under the term ‘Substitutions’.  For 
each simulation we can use the observed values of sales and consumer population to 
classify the outcome as ‘succession’, ‘substitution’ or ‘lock-out’.  
 
 
Summary Statistic  Value 
In Sample Successions  111 
In Sample Substitutions   160 
In Sample Total  360 
Out of Sample Succession  16 
Out of Sample Substitutions  21 
Out of Sample Total   40 
 
 
Here we present the logit model that considers the factors influencing a technological 
succession.  The model sets the dependent variable to 1 if there is succession and to 
zero otherwise. When estimating the model we used 360 ‘in sample’ observations to 
select and estimate the models and 40 ‘out of sample’ observations to test the 
prediction capacity of the selected logit model. Before selecting variables and 
estimating model the explanatory variables are normalised as follows.  For each 
variable we subtract the in-sample mean and divide by the in-sample standard 
deviation. Variable selection involves a stepwise elimination of variables in an 
attempt to minimise the Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC), which is a form of 
Penalised Maximum Likelihood Model Selection (PMLMS) (see Birchenhall et al., 
1999 for a discussion of this method).  Sin and White (1996) show that PMLMS leads 
asymptotically to the selection of the ‘best’ model, i.e. the model with the smallest 




Using this method of variable selection for the succession model, the variables are 
eliminated in the following order: θ , xmax, T1 and h1.  The best model includes T1 and 
h1, the estimated model being 
 
P = logit( 1.01 + 0.82 h1 - 0.72 T1 ) . 
 
 





Log Likelihood  180.2 
In Sample Succession Errors   26%  
In Sample No Succession Errors  18% 
In Sample Total  21%  
Out of Sample Succession Errors  19%  
Out of Sample No Succession Errors  5% 








The paper represents a first attempt to develop a multi-agent model of technological 
succession in the presence of network externalities.  The initial findings presented in 
the paper indicate the approach offers significant promise in terms of its ability to 
construct and probe complex models containing high degrees of non-linear interaction 
between multiple agents whose behaviour changes over time.  Stylised facts of 
production and consumption have been integrated within the model.  In the presence 
of imperfect capital markets, firms with finance R&D investments out of past profits.  
This establishes a strong positive feedback between past success in offering deigns 
with attractive quality-price characteristics, improved sales and profitability, current 
investment in R&D, and the future development of yet more attractive designs.  The 
existence of static and dynamic economies of scale adds a further spur to successful 
firms since those firms with market shares that grow faster than average, enjoy above-
average reductions in fixed operating costs (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Silverberg et 
al., 1988; Metcalfe, 1994; Klepper, 1996).   
 
 
Turning to the stylised facts of consumers, individual preferences are nested within 
group relationships and preferences evolve over time (Simmel, 1957; Bourdieu, 1984; 
Becker, 1984; Giddens, 1991).  Just as collectively firms learn about consumers, so 
consumers collectively also learn over time as they experience rival products offered 
in markets.  Hence, preferences and technological designs co-evolve through learning  19
and experimentation by heterogeneous populations of adaptive consumers and firms.  
When a technological shock occurs, and a radically new technology product is 
introduced into the market, at least some consumers will experiment with it and 
compare it with old technology designs.  Indeed, a necessary condition for a 




The logit model that has been estimated is statistically respectable and conforms to a 
number of intuitive expectations.  Where firms engage in mark-up pricing, they will 
adjust to a demonstrable demand for their designs and compete through product 
innovation.  Whether a technological discontinuity leads to a technological 
succession, a substitution, or else is locked-out by the old technology, ultimately 
depends on the evolving preferences of consumers.  In the model, a replicator 
dynamic is placed on consumer preferences.  Preferences that are well serviced will 
diffuse over time while those that are poorly serviced tend to disappear.   
Consequently, new technology firms must quickly develop designs that satisfy their 
target customers.  For a succession to occur in the model, new (type two) technology 
firms must quickly develop designs with quality-price combinations that provide their 
targeted (type two) consumers with higher levels of utility than those enjoyed by (type 
one) consumers serviced by old (type one) technology firms.  If not, then the network 
externalities accruing to the old technology continue to increase, locking out the new 
technology.   
 
 
In addition to highlighting the co-evolutionary interaction between technological 
designs and consumer preferences that drive emergent market structures, the paper 
explored the effect of four factors on the probability of a technological succession 
occuring.  First, superior performance by new technology designs in characteristics also 
offered by old technology designs; second, the introduction of distinct characteristics by 
new designs that are unavailable in old technology designs; third, different rates of 
reductions in fixed production costs between new and old technologies; and fourth, time.  
Only the first factor was considered by Shy’s model.  In our estimated logit model, the 
availability of new characteristics has a higher significance than the ability to offer 
improved performances over existing characteristics.  Intuitively, given diminishing 
marginal utility over the entire characteristic space, the initial gain arising from the 
consumption of a new characteristic is likely to be greater than that due to an incremental 
improvement in an existing characteristic.   
 
 
Turning to differential rates of cost reduction in the production of new and old 
technology designs, these do not appear to be a significant factor in the estimated 
succession logit model.  It may well be that relative costs prove to be a key factor in 
technological substitutions, where new technology firms sell to established (type one) 
consumer groups.  Certainly, this is an issue that needs to be considered in future 
research.  By contrast, time was found to be an important explanatory variable in the 
estimated logit model.  As one would intuitively expect, a negative relationship exists 
between the probability of a succession occurring and the length of time in which the old 
technology is able to establish itself.  Not only do the network externalities accruing to 
an old technology increase but longer periods of investment in R&D by old technology  20
firms improves the chance of their identifying designs that satisfy the preferences of 
(type one) users.  Hence, the longer the time period prior to the introduction of a new 
technology, the higher the differential in quality required of the new designs in order to 
overcome these lock-out effects. 
 
 
To summarise, the multi-agent model presented in the paper complements and 
extends Shy’s discussion of technological successions in the presence of network 
externalities.  Notably, its findings support the proposition that the simultaneous 
championing of a new technology by new firms and by one or more consumer groups 
that develop new preferences for its characteristics are necessary conditions for a 
technological succession.  Further, the findings suggest that the result does not depend 
on the assumption of homogeneous consumer preferences amongst later generations 
of adopters.  Investigation of the multi-agent model has also extended the discussion 
in a number of important respects.  Notably, it suggests that the introduction of novel 
characteristics are likely to have a greater bearing on the probability of a succession 
occurring than incremental performance gains in characteristics also offered by the 
old technology.  In addition, it highlights the importance of time as a variable.  Not 
only do network externalities accruing to an old technology increase over time but the 
ability of old technology firms to innovate and develop good quality designs increases 






Table 1: Glossary of notation and Default Batch Values 
 
Symbol Description  Default 
Ui(x,p)  Utility function for ith consumer group   
X  Design vector   
N  Number of characteristics in a design  8 
xmax  Maximum value of xi before T1  Random 
T1  Time of technological shock  Random 
D1  Design Space up to T1 Random 
D2  Design Space after T1 Random 
e  Network externality in period T1 Random 
h1  x∈  D1 has xi = 0 for I > h1 and β i = 0 for i > h1  Random 
h2  x∈  D2 has xi = 0 for i < h2 and β i = 0 for i < h2  1 
P  Price of good   
α   Vector of utility coefficients   
β   Coefficient on indirect utility of money   
M  Monetary budget of consumers  20 
vk  Component function of utility function   
W Indirect  utility  function   
G  Total population of consumers  60 
M  Number of consumer groups  8 
Git  Number of consumer in group i at time t   
Qjt  Quantity of good from firm j at time t   
Wit  Average utility attained by group i at time t   
ρ it  Proportion of population in group i at time t   
R  Strength of replicator effect  0.1 
C(x)  Unit variable cost of producing design x   
γ k  Coefficients in C(x)  
θ   Cost reduction factor  Random 
ck(xk)  Component functions in C(x)  
Φ   Fixed cost of production in each time period  2.0 
yjt  Level of production of firm j in period t   
η   Mark up on costs  0.25 
pjt  Price of j’th firm's output in period t  
qjt  Inventory of goods for firm j in period t   
Π jt  Current account profit for firm j in period t   
sjt  Sales for firm j in period t   
Mjt  Monetary wealth of firm j in period t   
djt  Demand for firm j’s output in period t   
χ   Partial adjustment factor for output  0.1 
Kjt  Capital = capacity for firm j at period t   
δ   Partial adjustment factor for capacity  0.25 
µ   Probability of mutation  0.3 
κ   Mutation size factor  0.05 
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